Analysis of Bagram protest/riot

Radio Free Europe offers the best analysis of the protest/riot at Bagram this week, clarifying the motives and origin of the protestors. The protestors were not from Bagram village, but from Deh Mullah, east of the base. There, a former commander of Mujuhideen-come-anti-US warlord Hekmatyar, was arrested in the middle of the night from his family compound. Hekmatyar is considered a major threat by US forces, according to RFE "the third party of the triumvirate fighting against Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government and its foreign backers."

His friends, family and fellow villagers claim that Commander Hamidullah renounced arms and decade ago and is now a farmer. US forces claim to have found explosives in his house and suspect him of planning an attack on Bagram Airbase. According to a US Army spokesman, Afghan police and Army were present at the arrest, in keeping with President Karzai's recent requests.

RFE's Amin Tarzi reveals the significance of these events surrounding Commander Hamidullah:

After less than one day in custody, the United States handed the eight men over to provincial authorities in Parwan on 27 July.

While the handover of the eight detainees to the Afghans might very well have quelled the anger of local residents of Bagram District, the longer term question of counterterrorist activities in Afghanistan, and the standing of the United States in that country, remains an open question.

There has been no credible accounting as to which of Afghanistan's former warlords have sincerely traded in their swords for plows, nor has any of them thus far been identified or arrested for their past deeds. Moreover, the Afghan judicial system remains in shambles with little hope of it returning soon to something that can be remotely regarded as a transparent and fair system in which cases can be tried. This situation is especially true in provinces where local loyalties often overpower any respect there is for the central Afghan government's laws and commitments, including its counterterrorism efforts. The Bagram riot clearly points to this problem, as no protests have targeted that base since late 2001 when some locals were arrested.

As such, the task for the United States in leading the war against terrorism and militancy in Afghanistan becomes very complicated. On one hand, with more intrusive operations the U.S. faces the possibility of dealing with more hostility to its presence in Afghanistan while on the other hand, in the absence of a robust Afghan commitment to investigate, arrest when needed, and incarcerate suspected terrorists, the chance for an Afghanistan free of the menace of terrorism might fall victim to short-term local expediencies.